Evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics in asymmetric two-population games Conference Paper uri icon

abstract

  • We analyze the main dynamical properties of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for asymmetric two-population games of finite size and its corresponding replicator dynamics. We introduce a definition of ESS for twopopulation asymmetric games and a method of symmetrizing such an asymmetric game. We show that every strategy profile of the asymmetric game corresponds to a strategy in the symmetric game, and that everyNash equilibrium(N E) of the asymmetric game corresponds to a (symmetric)N E of the symmetric version game.We study the (standard) replicator dynamics for the asymmetric game and we define the corresponding (non-standard) dynamics of the symmetric game. We claim that the relationship between N E, ESS and the stationary states (SS) of the dynamical system for the asymmetric game can be studied by analyzing the dynamics of the symmetric game. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011.

publication date

  • 2011-01-01