Corruption driven by imitative behavior Article

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Overview

abstract

• One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

authors

• Accinelli Gamba Elvio
• Carrera E.J.S.

publication date

• 2012-01-01

published in

• Economics Letters  Journal

Research

keywords

• Corrupt behavior; Evolutionary dynamics; Imitative behavior; Institutions and operations

Identity

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.092

Additional Document Info

start page

• 84

end page

• 87

volume

• 117

issue

• 1