abstract

• In this paper we study a repeated game and the replicator dynamics to analyze the spread of a rumor in a society formed by two populations. One population is informed about a rumor and communicates the rumor to the other population. According to the preferences of each individual, this rumor is communicated in its original or in a modified form. We analyze the stability of dynamic equilibria. We conclude that there are three possibilities for the spread of a rumor. The rumor may end up being disseminated in its original version or being distorted by the diffusers throughout the society, or a part of the population remains in the long term spreading the rumor in its original form and another in a distorted way.

authors

• Accinelli Gamba Elvio

publication date

• 2023-01-01

published in

• Journal of Dynamics and Games  Journal

keywords

• Rumors, rumors\' spread, repeated game, replicaor dynamics, dynamic game

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.3934/jdg.2022020

PubMed ID

start page

• 11

end page

• 23

volume

• 10

issue

• 1