Document
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Continuant
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Springer Proceedings in Mathematics
publication venue for: Poverty traps, rationality and evolution
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type: Generically Dependent Continuant
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type: Collection
type: Document
type: Continuant
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Entity
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Generically Dependent Continuant
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RDF description of Poverty traps, rationality and evolution - http://orbis.uaslp.mx/vivo/individual/scopus8803
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date: 2026-08-26T23:56:16
publisher: vivo
type: Document

Article
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Poverty traps, rationality and evolution
crisid: 8804
type: Article
most specific type: Conference Paper
type: Generically Dependent Continuant
date time value: conference paper date 8804
type: Entity
related by: authorship_62774
volume: 1
page end: 52
type: Conference Paper
abstract: We study an economy with heterogenous workers and firms as a two population game, in normal form, and its evolutionary dynamics implied by strategic complementarities. The population of firms is distributed in two groups, innovative and non innovative, while workers need to choose between two strategies, acquiring skills or remaining unskilled. Without having knowledge of the firms’ distribution, a worker reviews her strategy by asking herself whether it is worth it to change behavior or not. Rational choice on her part is taken, hereafter, to imply that she will choose the strategy which she expect to yield the greatest payoff, on the basis of her beliefs and the current state of the economy. By imitating successful agents, if the initial shares of innovative firms and skilled agents are “too small”, an economy eventually lead into a poverty trap. Hence, when an economy is close to a poverty trap, rationality may act as an actual obstacle to a take-off. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011.
most specific type: Document
EI dscopus: 2-s2.0-84930158412
type: Continuant
freetext keyword: Dynamical systems; Evolutionary dynamics; Innovative firms; Normal form; Population games; Strategic complementarity; Game theory
type: Information Content Entity
type: Document
origen: scopus
page start: 37
related by: authorship_62771
type: Thing
related by: authorship_62773
estado: published
has publication venue: Springer Proceedings in Mathematics
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-11456-4_4
related by: authorship_62772

Conference Paper
type: Class