A payoff system for job scheduling problems Article

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Overview

abstract

• In this paper we propose a modification to the concept of the potential of Hart and Mas-Colell to determine a payoff system for job scheduling problems. We obtain explicit formulas for the potential of job scheduling problems and for its corresponding payoff system. Also, we establish a relation between this payoff system and the Shapley value of a certain cooperative game.

authors

• Sánchez Pérez Joss Erick

publication date

• 2011-01-01

published in

• Applied Mathematical Sciences  Journal

Research

keywords

• Consistency; Job scheduling problems; Sequencing problems; Shapley value

Additional Document Info

start page

• 911

end page

• 920

volume

• 5

issue

• 17-20