ELECTORAL DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN POWER, THE OPPOSITION AND THE VOTERS AN APPROACH FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF GAME THEORY
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In this work we analyze, from the perspective of game theory, the interaction between the ruling elite, the opposition (to the government) and citizens during electoral times. In particular, we focus on the role that corruption plays (understood in a broad sense) in both contenders, government and opposition, and the level of information on the part of citizens when casting their vote to elect their representatives. To do this, we propose a game (the political game of the corruption and information C&I- political game), the result of which will depend on the level of corruption in the political sectors and the information of citizens about the actions of politicians. We affirm that - in a democracy in which the citizen vote is universal - although the proposals of the different political actors play an important role when deciding the vote, the level of information and interest of citizens in the political life of the country is the determining factor. Let us show that a low level of information on the part of citizens can lead to the re-election of a government with high levels of corruption regardless of the campaign carried out by the opposition. While an informed citizenry tends to favor the empowerment of an opposition with viable proposals against a corrupt government.
Evolutionary game theory; replicator dynamics; rumors with indifferent population Crime; Evolutionary game theory; Power; Replicator dynamics; Rumor with indifferent population; Game theory