abstract

• We study an evolutionary dynamics for the contributions by agents to a common/public good in a generalized version of Baliga and Maskin’s environmental protection model. The dynamical equilibria consist of three scenarios: a single agent contributing to preserve the good with its optimal contribution level, and all the other agents being free-riders: a group of agents with the same optimal contribution level contributing to preserve the good, and all the other agents being free-riders; one where no agents contribute. The dynamics of the contributions can be complex but we prove that each trajectory converges to the equilibrium associated to the single agent (or group of agents) with the highest preference for the good that are contributing since the beginning. We note that while the aggregate contribution is below the optimal contribution level of the agent with the smallest preference for the good, then the aggregate contribution is increasing and there is no free-riding. Hence, if the optimal contribution level of the agent with the smallest preference is enough to not exhaust the good too quickly and the optimal contribution level of the agent with the greatest preference is enough to preserve the good, then, in spite of the appearance of free-riding in the contributions, the good might not be exhausted. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.

authors

• Accinelli Gamba Elvio
• Martins F.
• Pinto A.

publication date

• 2021-01-01

funding provided via

• Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, FCT: PTDC/MAT-APL/31753/2017, UID/EEA/50014/2019  Grant

published in

• Journal of Evolutionary Economics  Journal

keywords

• Common and public goods; Evolutionary dynamics; Free-riding problems; Non-excludable goods/externalities; Stability

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1007/s00191-021-00758-z

PubMed ID

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