Firms, technology, training and government fiscal policies: An evolutionary approach Article uri icon

abstract

  • In this paper we propose and analyze a game theoretical model regarding the dynamical interaction between government fiscal policy choices toward innovation and training (I%26T), firm%27s innovation, and worker%27s levels of training and education. We discuss four economic scenarios corresponding to strict pure Nash equilibria: the government and I%26T poverty trap, the I%26T poverty trap, the I%26T high premium niche, and the I%26T ideal growth. The main novelty of this model is to consider the government as one of the three interacting players in the game that also allow us to analyse the I%26T mixed economic scenarios with a unique strictly mixed Nash equilibrium and with I%26T evolutionary dynamical cycles. © 2021 American Institute of Mathematical Sciences. All rights reserved.
  • In this paper we propose and analyze a game theoretical model regarding the dynamical interaction between government fiscal policy choices toward innovation and training (I%26T), firm's innovation, and worker's levels of training and education. We discuss four economic scenarios corresponding to strict pure Nash equilibria: the government and I%26T poverty trap, the I%26T poverty trap, the I%26T high premium niche, and the I%26T ideal growth. The main novelty of this model is to consider the government as one of the three interacting players in the game that also allow us to analyse the I%26T mixed economic scenarios with a unique strictly mixed Nash equilibrium and with I%26T evolutionary dynamical cycles. © 2021 American Institute of Mathematical Sciences. All rights reserved.
  • In this paper we propose and analyze a game theoretical model regarding the dynamical interaction between government fiscal policy choices toward innovation and training (I&T), firm%27s innovation, and worker%27s levels of training and education. We discuss four economic scenarios corresponding to strict pure Nash equilibria: the government and I&T poverty trap, the I&T poverty trap, the I&T high premium niche, and the I&T ideal growth. The main novelty of this model is to consider the government as one of the three interacting players in the game that also allow us to analyse the I&T mixed economic scenarios with a unique strictly mixed Nash equilibrium and with I&T evolutionary dynamical cycles. © 2021 American Institute of Mathematical Sciences. All rights reserved.

publication date

  • 2021-01-01