abstract

• In this paper, we study the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) for symmetric games with n ≥ 3 players. The main properties of these games and strategies are analyzed and several examples are provided. We relate the concept of ESS with previous literature and provide a proof of finiteness of ESS in the context of symmetric games with n ≥ 3 players. We show that unlike the case of n = 2, when there are more than two populations an ESS does not have a uniform invasion barrier, or equivalently, it is not equivalent to the strategy performing better against all strategies in a neighborhood. We also construct the extended replicator dynamics for these games and we study an application to a model of strategic planning of investment. © 2019 World Scientific Publishing Company.

authors

• Accinelli Gamba Elvio
• Martins F.
• Oviedo J.

publication date

• 2019-01-01

funding provided via

• Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, Paraguay, El CONACYT  Grant
• Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, CONACYT: 167004, PTDC/MAT-NAN/6890/2014  Grant
• Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientí­ficas y Técnicas, CONICET: PIP 112-200801-00655  Grant
• Universidad Nacional de San Luis, UNSL: 03-2016  Grant

published in

• International Game Theory Review  Journal

keywords

• dynamic stability; Evolutionary stable strategy; invasion barriers; local superior strategies; n-symmetric games

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1142/S0219198919500051

start page

end page

volume

• 21

issue

• 4