Comparabilidad parcial con mediciones cardinales y elección colectiva
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Under the framework of Arrow%27s impossibility theorem, all the information based on interpersonal comparisons is avoided in the construction process of colective choice rules. However, throught the use of utility functions and the comparison of several measurable aspects, among all individuals, some non dictatorial collective rules have been characterized and they have been used empirically. In this work we study a general framework to make interpersonal comparisons with cardinal utilities. We characterize a partial comparability concept admiting like extremes full comparisons between all the individuals or no one comparison between any pair of individuals. Our concept provides basis to propose a clasification of social welfare orderings, each one can be characterized with standard assumptions and the type of interpesonal comparisons admited.
Under the framework of Arrow's impossibility theorem, all the information based on interpersonal comparisons is avoided in the construction process of colective choice rules. However, throught the use of utility functions and the comparison of several measurable aspects, among all individuals, some non dictatorial collective rules have been characterized and they have been used empirically. In this work we study a general framework to make interpersonal comparisons with cardinal utilities. We characterize a partial comparability concept admiting like extremes full comparisons between all the individuals or no one comparison between any pair of individuals. Our concept provides basis to propose a clasification of social welfare orderings, each one can be characterized with standard assumptions and the type of interpesonal comparisons admited.
