abstract

• Edith Stein’s view on empathy allows us to understand how the encounter with the “other” is about experiencing the other as an origin, that is, one is aware that the other is living in the present tense as a first person. This does not mean that the act of empathy merely consists in “feeling what the other feels,” nor is it a certain substitution from my “self” to the other. Rather, the empathic act implies an acknowledgement that the other is the origin of his or her own experiencing. This recognition of the other allows for a common world. For Stein, the perceived world and the world given through empathy are the same world seen differently. What is held in “common” is that the world that appears to me is the same world that the other encounters independent from me and the limitations of my own subjectivity. For Stein, this synthesis between “I” and “other” generates genuine community. The ontic structure of the human person encounters other persons as other subjects able to act in a world that is socially constituted. This dynamism—this “coming out from oneself” and “getting inside oneself”—implies that the human person is “intentional” on an ontic level. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

authors

• Monjaraz Fuentes Paulina

publication date

• 2022-01-01

published in

• Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences  Book

keywords

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1007/978-3-030-91198-0_15

PubMed ID

start page

• 201

end page

• 209

volume

• 12

issue